Defrosting Conflict
Alarmism over Russia’s Role in Transdnestr Belies the Potential of an Upcoming Moscow Conference Special to Russia Profile 09/14/2011Once again Transdnestr has become the focus of attention among specialists across the post-Soviet space. On September 9, under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OECD), an international conference was held during which the Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat met the President of the Unrecognized Transdnestr Moldovan Republic Igor Smirnov.
Contact between representatives of Tiraspol and Chisinau over the past ten years has been fitful. In 2001 Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin was reelected on a ticket of reintegrating the country. He criticized his predecessors harshly for provincial nationalism and a lack of flexibility. The Voronin of 2001 was even ready to legally acknowledge aggression from Chisinau against the left bank of the Dnestr. However, slogans and real politics do not always coincide. Rejecting a Russian plan (known as the Dmitry Kozak Plan) to reunite the country on federal principles, Moldovan leaders in 2003 gave up talks with Transdnestr’s de-facto leadership as lost. It was only at the end of 2008 that the conflicting sides made timid steps toward each other once again.
But the long-awaited meeting of the leaders of Moldova and Transdnestr did not make the negotiating process irreversible, especially since in 2009 the Moldovan political system suffered a crisis. A series of parliamentary campaigns failed to result in the election of a head of state (Moldova is a parliamentary republic). In this context, the peace process was relegated to secondary importance. Since this time there has been no official attempt to renew the “5 + 2” format, which envisaged a resolution between the two conflicting sides and five other interested parties – two guarantor-states – Ukraine and Russia, an OECD mediator and two observer states – the United States and the EU.
At the latest meeting in Germany, the sides agreed to meet in Moscow on September 22, 2011, to make provisions for a return to fully-fledged talks. However, the very fact that Igor Smirnov agreed to be drawn into the negotiating process (albeit half-heartedly) already means a lot. Firstly, for many years he was forbidden to travel in Europe. In September of 2011, this ban was lifted in the hopes that the Transdnestr leader would take up constructive positions. Secondly, in December 2011 presidential elections are set to take place in Transdnestr, and Smirnov is expected to take part in what will be his fifth election campaign. It is not hard to understand that for a politician who has counted on separation from Moldova, taking part in negotiations with Chisinau is not a simple choice.
And as often happens in such cases, experts are looking for “Moscow’s footprint.” In reality, not long before the September conference in Germany, Russian law enforcement agencies showed interest in the business of certain members of Smirnov’s family. And the fact that Russia is not interested in prolonging the leader’s time in power is no secret. Recent announcements from representatives of the Russian Consulate have also caused a stir: they have said that inhabitants of Transdnestr applying for Russian citizenship can no longer do so in Tiraspol and now have to go to the Moldovan capital. Those who do not have Moldovan citizenship are also obliged to apply for a Moldovan residence permit.
It has to be noted, however, that the meeting of Filat and Smirnov, as well as pressure from Moscow, can be interpreted as an attempt by Russia to act to resolve an old conflict by diplomatic means. It is not the first year that Russia has taken part in either relations with Transdnestr (for example the March 18, 2009 meeting of the presidents of Russia, Moldova and Transdnestr) or the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process (three-way meetings between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia have already become a regular occurrence). And although there have been no obvious breakthroughs, the negotiating process in itself can be seen as positive. But in the case of Transdnestr, in contrast with Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow’s diplomacy is frequently taken as a sign of weakness. Recent events led to critical media response in both Russia and Transdnestr. It is not the first time that this kind of alarmism has emerged. Two years ago criticism was directed at the joint statement issued on March 18, 2009, which stated that Russia was ready to transform the current peace process to a “peace-guaranteeing process.” This position was then described as a practical defeat for Russian diplomacy, although Moscow only started talking about such a transformation after achieving a compromise between the conflicting factions, and not a day earlier!
In 2011 pressure on president Smirnov was called “a loss” and “a defeat.” But if we put emotions aside, recent events have hardly revealed anything new. Did Moscow really ever make public promises to recognize a de-jure Transdnestrian state? The celebrated Kozak Plan of 2003, which failed following the decisive participation of the Moldovan elite together with Western diplomats, by no means suggested secession. It was based on a suggestion to create a federative Moldovan state (officially Chisinau prefers the autonomy of Transdnestr in a unitary formation), but this did not encompass self-determination of the disputed territory. The same is true of all the preceding documents linked to the peace process that were prepared with Russian participation.
Where is such alarmism coming from? Russia itself has certainly played a role, with its policies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Three years ago Russia recognized their independence and today it is increasing its military-political and economic presence in the two previously autonomous Georgian states. But this move was necessary – it is not the consequence of implementing an imperial plan, but a reaction to the process of frozen conflicts thawing, which began in Tbilisi in that year. Within the narrow corridor of possibilities Moscow took a decision that created many potential political risks. But this does not mean that the main aim of Russian politics in the post-Soviet space should be direct clashes with all of the former republics of the Soviet Union and their Western partners. Is this a priority for Russian foreign policy? Hardly. Conducting a narrow diplomatic game, maintaining its strong position in both Chisinau and Tiraspol is much more promising. The rupture between Russia and Georgia only happened when room for maneuver in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts had been exhausted.
But such possibilities do remain on the Dnestr! It’s also important to remember that Russia is not the only player in the Moldova-Transdnestr peace process. And if Chisinau fails to understand Russia’s moves, or they spur an inadequate action from the Moldovan government, there is always the option to freeze this or that diplomatic activity, particularly as Moscow has shown more than once that it is ready for one-sided concessions, which are not in its interests (such as the rapid withdrawal of its troops from the area or agreeing to a Unitarian Moldova, without taking into account Transdnestr’s interests.)
Therefore it is unreasonable to push Russian diplomacy toward a tough choice: revisionism or maintaining the status-quo. It will be much more productive for Russia to act based on the situation and not sticking to one plan, maintaining the status quo where it is convenient and breaking it where there is no alternative.
Sergei Markedonov, Ph.D., is a political analyst and a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Russia and Eurasia Program, Washington, DC.
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